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ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE-BANK'S CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION FOR DEPOS-
ITS AT EXPROPRIATED CUBAN BRANCH:-Garcia v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A.'- In Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Chase Man-
hattan Bank's home office was liable for certificates of deposit (CDs)2
purchased at its Cuban branch even though the branch was later ex-
propriated by the Cuban Government.3 The court refused to apply the
act of state doctrine4 to insulate the bank from liability,' and found
1. 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984).
2. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
A certificate of deposit is:
[A] written acknowledgment by a bank of the receipt of a sum of money on
deposit which it promises to pay to the depositor, to his order, or to some other
person or to his order, whereby the relation of debtor and creditor between the
bank and the depositor is created.
5B MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING § 313, at 235 (1983); see also U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(c)(1977):
"A writing which complies with the requirements of this section is (c) a 'certificate of
deposit' if it is an acknowledgment by a bank of receipt of money with an agreement to
repay it." Id.
3. 735 F.2d at 650.
4. For a brief explanation of the act of state doctrine, consider the following view, as
expressed by the American Law Institute:
When an agency of another state has taken action affecting legal relationships of
persons or things within its territory and has done so in a manner which makes
it clear that it is giving effect to the public interests of the state, the act of state
doctrine precludes a court in the United States, except as provided by statute,
from examining such action. The policy underlying the doctrine is that the
courts should abstain from any action that might hinder the Executive Branch
in the conduct of foreign relations.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 41 comment c (1965).
It should also be noted that the act of state doctrine is usually viewed as a rule of
domestic law of the United States rather than a requirement of international law. Id. § 9
comment c, § 41 comment a; see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 421 (1964).
For a general overview of the act of state doctrine, see generally Kramer, Modern
Status of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 A.L.R. FED. 707 (1971); Note, Adjudicating Acts
of State in Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns: A Political Question Analysis, 51 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 722 (1982); Note, Judicial Balancing of Foreign Policy Considerations:
Comity and Errors Under the Act of State Doctrine, 35 STANFORD L. REV. 327 (1983);
Note, The Status of the Act of State Doctrine-Application to Litigation Arising from
Confiscations of American Owned Property in Iran, 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 89
(1980).
For a comparative analysis of the English concept of the doctrine, see Singer, The
Act of State Doctrine of the United Kingdom: An Analysis with Comparisons to United
States Practice, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 283 (1981). For a survey of countries embracing the
doctrine, see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW notes following § 4.
N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The RESTATEMENT defines an act of state as follows:
An "act of state" . . . involves the public interests of state as state, as distinct
from its interest in providing the means of adjudicating disputes or claims that
arise within its territory. In determining whether an act is an act of state, the
branch or agency of the government-Executive, Judicial, or Legislative-that
performed the act is not as important as is the nature of the action taken. A
judgment of a court may be an act of state. Usually, it is not, because it involved
the interests of private litigants or because court adjudication is not the usual
way in which the state exercises its jurisdiction to give effect to its public
interests.
A typical state action treated as an "act of state" is the taking by a state of
property within its own territory.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 41 comment d (1965).
The act of state doctrine in the United States has its roots in The Schooner Ex-
change v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). See First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). The Supreme Court first set forth the
doctrine in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897):
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed by sovereign
powers as between themselves.
Id. at 252.
Clearly, the public policy behind the act of state doctrine is to protect foreign affairs
relations between sovereigns. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche
Stoomvaart-Maatschaapij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam), modifying, 173 F.2d
71 (2d Cir. 1949). Thus, in accordance with the separation of powers principles and a
desire for the nation to speak with one voice in foreign affairs, see United States v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), courts refuse to make decisions that may
effect or embarrass the nation in conducting its foreign policy. See generally Note, Adju-
dicating Act of State in Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns: A Political Question Analy-
sis, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 722 (1982); Note, Judicial Authority and Presidential Compe-
tence: Conflicting Powers Affecting Claims Against Foreign States, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 193 (1982).
Case Law and legislation, however, have created exceptions and complicated the doc-
trine. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (doctrine applied
even when foreign sovereign's actions violated international law); Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (creation of the commercial act
exception to the act of state doctrine); Bernstein, 210 F.2d 375, supra (creation of the
"Bernstein exception" to the act of state doctrine); 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976) (the
"Sabbatino amendment" to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 was passed with the in-
tent to reverse part of the Sabbatino decision. See S. REP. No. 1188, Part I, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 24 (1964)); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 431 F.2d 394
(2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 406 U.S. 759 (1972) (the "Sabbatino amendment"
confined to cases where confiscated property has been brought into the United States).
This comment deals only with the act of state doctrine and not the international law
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Although the two are closely linked, and their terms
often used interchangeably, they are, in fact, distinct. Sovereign immunity is a defense
available to a state when a claim is brought against it in the court of another state. It is a
defense available to the sovereign when sued directly and it bars the consideration of a
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that Chase was liable because the contractual obligations6 undertaken
by the branch ensured the depositor of repayment in the event that
Cuba seized the debt.
7
In 1958, during the last months of the Batista regime in Cuba,
Juanita Gonzales Garcia (plaintiff) and her late husband Jose Lorenzo
Perez Dominguez purchased several non-negotiable CDs from Chase
Manhattan Bank's Vedado branch in Cuba.8 The incentive for the
purchase was concern for "the safety of (their] money (because ofi the
on-going Cuban revolution."' The bank officials agreed that "the de-
posit was a 'private contract' between the bank and Dominguez and
Garcia,'" and assured the plaintiff and her husband that they were
"doing the right thing 'because it was an insurance, security for the
money'. . . that Chase's main office in New York would guarantee the
certificate[s], and that they could be repaid by presenting the certifi-
cate[s] at any Chase branch world-wide."I
In 1959, Fidel Castro assumed control of Cuba and the revolution-
ary Cuban Government enacted Law No. 78,"1 which enabled the Min-
claim, including an examination of the act (of the state) which gave rise to the claim. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 41 comment e (1965). As to the act of
state doctrine:
When a claim involving an act of state is brought against a person whose
rights are based on the act of a foreign state but who is not entitled to that
state's defense of immunity or against a thing in its possession, it is the act of
state doctrine alone that is invoked.
Id.
5. In Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1984),
a case almost identical to Garcia on the facts, the Court of Appeals of New York held
that Cuba's confiscation of bank deposits relieved the bank of liability to pay the deposi-
tor. Id.; see infra notes 72-75 and 94-112 and accompanying text.
6. 735 F.2d at 650. The certificates of deposit purchased at Chase's Cuban branch
created a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and the depositor (plaintiff). Id.
at 649; see infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text. See also supra note 2.
7. 735 F.2d at 650. The majority and minority, however, disagree on this point. Com-
pare id. at 650 n.6 with id. at 652 n.l. See also infra notes 45-53 and 119-21 and accom-
panying text.
8. 735 F.2d at 646-47. On March 10, 1958, Dominguez and Garcia bought a CD for
100,000 pesos returnable on March 10, 1959 at an interest rate of three and one-half
percent. On September 16, 1959, they brought a CD for 400,000 pesos returnable on
March 16, 1959 at an interest of three percent. Id.
9. Id. at 646.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 647. Cuban Law No. 78 provides as follows:
CHAPTER I
The Ministry and Its Jurisdiction
Article 1. The Ministry of Recovery of Misappropriated Property is the
proper organization of the Executive Power intended to recover property of any
19861
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istry of Recovery of Misappropriated Property' 3 to freeze bank ac-
counts."' The Ministry froze the plaintiff's "account," ordered it closed,
and demanded that "Chase remit its value."' 5 Chase complied by send-
ing a sum equal to the debt amount to the Ministry.'6 In 1960, the
Cuban Government nationalized Chase's Cuban branch, and the Na-
tional Bank of Cuba assumed the branch's assets and liabilities."
After attempting unsuccessfully to collect on the CDs from
Chase,' Garcia commenced an action against Chase in 1976 to secure
type which has been removed from the National Wealth and obtain the com-
plete restoration of the proceeds of unjust enrichments obtained under the cover
of the Public Power and to the detriment of said wealth.
For the purposes of the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the National
Wealth is understood to be formed by the Wealth of the State, of the Provinces,
of the Municipalities, of the Autonomous and Parastatal Organizations, and of
the Savings Banks and Social Insurance.
Article 2. For the purposes of the Present Law, the right of action of the
Ministry covers:
a) Public officials and servants and officials and employees of autonomous
corporations and bodies, and those set forth in Article 154 of the Organic Law of
the Court of Accounts.
b) Private natural or juridical persons who in any way have intervened in
the matters forming the object of investigation and whose conduct has resulted
in damage to the national wealth and enrichment for the benefit of said persons
obtained under the coverage of the Public Power.
c) Natural or juridicial persons who, as a result of the investigations car-
ried out, are shown to appear fraudulently as owners of property and holders of
rights which actually belong to the person who is the object of the proceedings
and in such case the action for return governed by the present Law can be
brought against such persons.
Article 5. The Ministry shall decree the precautionary measure which may
be necessary in order to assure the purpose pursued by this Law, and particu-
larly the following:
a) The freezing of bank accounts, the sealing and opening of safe deposit
boxes in banks or in other private institutions.
Id. at n.1.
13. The Ministry is defined in article 1 of Cuban Law No. 78. See supra note 12.
14. Article 5, § (a) specifically provides that the Ministry has the power to freeze
bank accounts. See supra note 12.
15. 735 F.2d at 647.
16. Id. The court places a great deal of emphasis on the origin and nature of the
funds confiscated by the Ministry. See infra notes 27-32, 43-44 and accompanying text.
17. 735 F.2d at 647. On July 6, 1960, the Castro government enacted Law No. 851,
which provided for the nationalization of United States firms in Cuba. Chase's branches
were nationalized pursuant to Resolution No. 2 of September 17, 1960. See also Perez,
61 N.Y.2d at 463 (1984).
18. 735 F.2d at 647. In 1964, Dominguez inquired of Chase as to the status of the
CDs. Chase advised him of Cuba's actions and told him to address further inquiries to
the National Bank of Cuba. In 1968, Garcia made a similar inquiry. The Chase response
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payment. 9 After a jury trial, Judge Broderick of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York entered a judg-
ment awarding $760,383.00 as the amount due on the CDs.2"
On appeal, Chase attacked Garcia's claim on several grounds.
Chase's principal substantive argument21 was that Cuba's actions
amounted to a seizure and cancellation of the bank's debt to the plain-
tiff.2 2 Additionally, Chase argued that the act of state doctrine pre-
vented the court from questioning the validity of Cuba's
expropriation.
2
Judge Meskill, writing the Second Circuit's majority opinion, sum-
marized the bank's argument 24 as follows:
Chase seeks to avoid liability to Garcia on the basis of the Cu-
ban government's actions. It argues that while the CDs could
be repaid at any Chase branch worldwide, Cuba's closing of
Garcia's "account" and its appropriation of Chase's funds in a
sum equal to the amount of its debt to Dominguez and Garcia
prior to their presentment of the CDs canceled the debt. It
was not introduced into evidence. In 1970, Dominguez made another inquiry, and Chase
answered by noting and repeating its 1964 response. Id.
19. Id. at 647-48.
20. Id. at 646; see also Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 77 Civ. 5340 (S.D.N.Y. June
7, 1983).
21. In addition to its substantive argument on liability for the CDs, Chase argued
that Garcia's claim was barred by the New York statute of limitations. Chase claimed
that the "events of 1959 and 1960 and its communication of those facts to Garcia and
Dominguez by letters in 1964 and 1968 constituted a clear and unequivocal repudiation"
which commenced the running of the statutory period. 735 F.2d at 648. Consequently,
because an action for breach of contract must be brought within six years of the accrual
of the cause of action, N.Y. Civ. PEAc. LAW § 213 (McKinney 1972), the statutory period
would have run as of 1984. See Hgoc Dung Thi Tran v. Citibank N.A., 586 F. Supp. 203
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). Conversely, Garcia argued that the Puerto Rican statute of limitations
should be applied. 735 F.2d at 648 n.2.
The court noted that "since there is no applicable federal statute of limitations, it is
appropriate to look to state law." Id. As to Garcia's argument that the Puerto Rican
statute of limitation should be applied, the court held that "the point is moot ... due to
our conclusion that her action is not barred by the shorter New York statute of limita-
tions." Id. Citing N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 3-122(2) and 3-504, the court concluded that the cause
of action on a certificate of deposit accrues upon demand and that demand occurs upon
presentment and refusal to pay. Id. at 648. The court also found that Chase's letters
were not clear and unequivocal repudiation. Id. Thus, the court held that the statute of
limitations did not begin to run until Garcia made a formal demand for payment on the
CDs by filing her complaint. Id. at 648-49.
22. Id. at 649.
23. Id.
24. For the court's decision on Chase's statute of limitation argument, see supra note
1986]
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then asserts that we may not question the validity of the Cu-
ban government's actions under the act of state doctrine.
2 6
The court concluded that "Chase's arguments on both of these issues
must fail."
26
In addressing the expropriation of the deposits, the court reasoned
that the mere seizure of assets did not affect Chase's contractual obli-
gation for the CDs.2 7 The majority found that the expropriated funds
came not "from funds specifically earmarked to Dominguez's and Gar-
cia's 'account' " but, rather, from Chase's general funds, because "title
to the deposits was vested in Chase, which became debtor of Domin-
guez and Garcia. s28 The court reasoned, therefore, that the bank's pay-
ment of "an equivalent sum of its own money to a third party" affected
Chase's assets but not Chase's debt to the plaintff.29 To illustrate this
point, Judge Meskill analogized the expropriation of the CDs to a bank
robbery.30 The Judge wrote: "The Cuban government did nothing more
than 'enter' Chase's Vedado branch armed with Law No. 78 and de-
mand depositors' money.131 In applying this analysis, the court con-
cluded that the debt was not extinguished when "Chase turned over
funds without requiring surrender of the CDs, without notice to the
holder of the CDs, and without a fight. '32
In addressing Chase's second argument, the court found that
"Chase cannot use the act of state doctrine as a defense because the
doctrine is not implicated."33 Because the court accepted Chase's argu-
ment that, if the situs of the debt were in Cuba, the Cuban Govern-
ment could validly seize it, 4 the majority opinion clearly implied that
the situs of the debt was not in Cuba. 5 Judge Meskill went a step
25. 735 F.2d at 649.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. The quoted passage refers to the distinction between "general" and "special"
deposits. See infra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
29. 735 F.2d at 649.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.; see infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text. See also 5B MICHIE, supra note
2, § 326(a) at 317-18 ("A bank acts at its peril in paying a certificate without surrender
thereof and endorsement ....").
33. 735 F.2d at 651. The dissent, however, noted that "[t]he majority's result may not
have such [international repercussions] in this case, but since it has no foundation
whatever in the facts found by the jury it creates precedent that may be used in future
cases that could involve such repercussions." Id. at 653. See also infra notes 45-53 and
113-21 and accompanying text.
34. 735 F.2d at 650; see infra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
35. Id. at 650 n.5. Citing Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392
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further, however, and proclaimed that "even if what occurred was a
seizure of the debt and not merely payment of a sum equal to it, the
facts in the instant case call for a result favoring Garcia. '3 6 Thus, the
majority dismissed Chase's act of state doctrine defense and applied an
analysis based on the "private contract" between the parties.3 7
The court found the purpose of the "private contract" between
Chase and Garcia and Dominguez to be determinative. The majority
determined that the purpose of the agreement was "to ensure that, no
matter what happened in Cuba, including seizure of the debt, Chase
would still have a contractual obligation to pay depositors upon pres-
entation of the CDs.""s The court reasoned that Garcia and Dominguez
deposited their money with Chase because of that bank's "interna-
tional reputation."3 9 The court implied that the depositors wanted to
be able to collect on the CDs outside of Cuba in case they were pre-
vented from doing so inside Cuba. 0
The court also implied that the "private contract" between the
parties was a method of allocating the risk involved in a possible Cu-
ban expropriation. Judge Meskill stated: "Chase 'accepted the risk that
it would be liable elsewhere for obligations incurred by its branch.' "41
The court concluded that "if the understanding was that the debt
could be paid by turning over the amount of the debt to the Cuban
government if it should win the race to the bank, it is apparent that
the deposits would never have been made. '4
In contrast to the majority opinion, the dissent focused on the act
of state doctrine. Judge Kearse reasoned that, because Cuba was the
situs of the debt and the parties did not specify that the debt could be
collected only outside of Cuba, Cuba's seizure of Garcia's assets, by
F.2d 706, 714 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968), the court noted that "[tihe
situs of intangible property is about as intangible a concept as is known to the law."
Garcia, 735 F.2d at 650 n.5. The court concluded: "where a foreign government has both
the parties and the res before it and alters their relationship thereto, our courts realize
that there is little that they can do to change the legal relationship." Id. Thus, when the
court stated: "Even if what occurred was a seizure of the debt" immediately after dis-
cussing the situs requirement, it implied that Cuba's actions did not meet the above
quoted definition of situs. Id. at 650.
36. 735 F.2d at 650. By the term "the facts of the instant case," the court seems to
have been referring to the purpose of the contract between depositor and the bank. See
infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
37. 735 F.2d at 646. The purchase of the CDs was termed a "private contract" be-
tween the bank and depositors. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. See also infra notes 78-121 and accompanying text.
42. Id.
19861
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ordering Chase to deliver those assets to the Cuban Government, was a
collection of the debt.'" Applying the act of state doctrine, Judge
Kearse refused "to question the Cuban government's implicit declara-
tion that it need not present [the CDs] in order to seize [the debt]
)144
In addressing the majority's conclusion that the purpose of the
agreement was to "ensure the safety of Garcia's funds," the dissent
argued that the jury's findings did not support that conclusion." Judge
Kearse stated:
The parties could, of course, have agreed that even if the Cu-
ban government required Chase to pay it a sum equal to Gar-
cia's account, Chase would still have a contractual obligation to
pay Garcia. But the jury found that the parties did not con-
template that event in their agreement."
s
The dissent noted that, in response to interrogatories numbered four
and five, the jury found that Chase's branch paid over to the Cuban
Government a sum of money equal to the value of the plaintiff's certifi-
cates of deposit 47 and that the parties did not contemplate in their
agreements that such a payment might be made.'8 The dissent, there-
fore, concluded that the majority's contractual obligation analysis was
inapplicable.4 9
The majority addressed the dissent's criticism by noting that the
responses to interrogatories four and five were ambiguous 0 and that,
43. Id. at 651-52.
44. Id. at 652. See also supra note 4.
45. 735 F.2d at 652-53.
46. Id. at 652. (Emphasis in the original).
47. Id. at n.1. The jury answered affirmatively with respect to interrogatory 4:
(4) Has it been established by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Verdado (sic) branch of Chase Manhattan in 1959 paid over to the Cuban gov-
ernment a sum of money equal to the value of plaintiff's certificates of deposit?
Id.
48. Id. Having answered interrogatory 4 in the affirmative, the jury responded in the
negative to interrogatory 5:
(5) If the answer is yes, did the parties contemplate in their agreements
that such a payment might be made?
Id.
49. Id. at 652-53.
50. Id. at 650 n.6. The majority wrote as follows:
The dissenting opinion states that the jury decided specifically that the par-
ties did not contemplate that Chase would guarantee the safety of its obligations
to Garcia. We disagree. The fact that the jury gave a negative response to inter-
rogatory 5, which asked if the parties "contemplate[d] in their agreements that
such a payment might be made," does not indicate to us that the jury deter-
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in view of the jury's determination that the defendant was liable to
plaintiff with respect to the CDs,"' it was not improper to resolve all
inferences in favor of Garcia.2 The dissent did not accept this inter-
pretation of the jury's findings and voiced a strong disapproval of what
it deemed to be the majority's substitution of its own view for that of
the jury.s
The dissent was also concerned about the unfairness of requiring
the bank to pay the same debt twice. Judge Kearse reasoned that, if
Chase paid on its debt to Garcia pursuant to a valid decree of the Cu-
ban Government, it should not be compelled to pay that debt a second
time to Garcia.5
4
DIsCUSSION
The Garcia decision can be divided into three parts: (1) an analy-
sis of the nature and origin of the sum of money confiscated by Cuba;
(2) an analysis of the act of state doctrine defense; and (3) an analysis
of the "private contract" between Chase's branch and Garcia. Judge
Meskill concluded that the mere seizure of assets did not affect Chase's
contractual obligation on the CDs,5 5 that "Chase cannot use the act of
mined that the parties did not agree that Chase would ensure against expropria-
tion by the Cuban government .... The jury's response to interrogatory 5
could have meant that the parties never contemplated that the Vedado branch
would make such a payment in 1959. The jury also could have interpreted inter-
rogatory 5 to inquire whether the parties agreed that such a payment should be
made.
Id. (emphasis in original).
51. Id. The majority pointed to the jury responses to interrogatories 7 and 8 as the
factual determination of the defendant's liability. The majority provided the following
jury responses:
Q. "Do you find a preponderance of the evidence that defendant is liable
to plaintiff with respect to (the two CDsl?"
A: "Yes."
Id.
52. Id. The majority wrote as follows:
In the absence of a specific and unambiguous finding by the jury on the question
of whether Chase agreed to guarantee the safety of the obligation, it was not
improper to resolve all inferences in favor of Garcia given the jury's determina-
tion as to liability.
Id.
53. Id. at 652-53. The dissent wrote: "The majority does not set aside any of the jury
findings on any principled basis. It simply ignores them and substitutes its own views."
Id.
54. Id. at 653. Judge Kearse wrote: "I conclude that there is no basis for holding
Chase to be an insurer and that the debts owed by Chase to Garcia ceased to exist upon
their seizure by the Cuban governnment." Id.
55. Id. at 649; see infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
1986]
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state doctrine as a defense because the doctrine is not implicated,"56
and that "the facts in the instant case call for a result favoring
Garcia."57
1. Nature and Origin of the Sum of Money Confiscated
Bank deposits can be classified as being either "general" or "spe-
cial" accounts."8 In a general deposit, money in the bank's possession is
the bank's property and the relationship between the bank and the
depositor is one of debtor and creditor." In the case of a special de-
posit, title in the property deposited remains in the depositor, even
while the property is in the bank's possession, and the relationship be-
tween the bank and the depositor is one of bailee and bailor.6 °
In Garcia, the CDs were deemed general deposits.61 The court ap-
plied the distinction noted above, and concluded that the expropria-
tion had no impact on the debtor-creditor relationship between the
bank and Garcia.6 2 As the dissent pointed out, however, that analysis
fails to address Chase's argument that the Cuban Government seized
the debt, not just a sum of money equal to the debt.63
Chase's argument incorporated the concept of seizure of the debt
with an act of state doctrine defense.6 ' One commentator has ad-
dressed the distinction between seizure of assets and seizure of debts
and has concluded that, whereas a nationalization of assets may not
affect a bank's liabilities, the nationalization of assets and liabilities
accompanied by an application of the act of state doctrine may free a
bank of contractual obligations incurred by its branch.6 5 Clearly, the
court could not limit its inquiry to a mere seizure of assets analysis and
was forced to address the alleged seizure of the debt.
56. 735 F.2d at 651; see infra notes 66-77 and 76-126 and accompanying text.
57. 735 F.2d at 650; see infra notes 76-126 and accompanying text.
58. 5B MICHIE. supra note 2, § 328.
59. Id.; Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank International Corp., 540 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1976)
(depositor held no assignable title to the Swiss Francs on general deposit in Luxem-
bourg); Kondo v. Katzenback, 356 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484 (1967) (Yen deposited in American branch of Japa-
nese banks were property of bank and not property of depositors).
60. 5B MICHIE, supra note 2, § 328.
61. 735 F.2d at 649. Judge Meskill noted that "the money did not come from funds
specifically earmarked to Dominguez's and Garcia's 'account.'" Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 652.
64. Id. at 649.
65. Heininger, Liability of U.S. Banks for Deposits Placed in Their Foreign
Branches, 11 L. & POL. INT'L. Bus. 903, 1020 (1979); see infra note 86 and accompanying
text.
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2. Act of State Doctrine Defense
The act of state doctrine applies to a seizure of a debt only when
the situs of the debt is within the sovereign's territory.66 The situs re-
quirement has its roots in the definition of the doctrine, 7 which re-
quires that the sovereign act be "within its own territory."" Accord-
ingly, as Judge Meskill acknowledged, "if the situs of Chase's debt
were in Cuba, the Cuban government could validly seize it." 9
The situs of a debt depends upon the existence of jurisdiction over
the debtor.70 In Garcia, Cuba had jurisdiction over Chase's branch, be-
cause the bank was doing business in Cuba subject to that sovereign's
laws. Consequently, the dissent's argument, that the act of state doc-
trine extinguishes Chase's debt on the CDs,7 1 seems very persuasive.
In Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,7 2 a case almost identical
66. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982). See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. See also Re-
public of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965) (Assets in New
York bank were not within Iraq, even though King Faisal, to whom the assets belonged,
Tesided and 'was phnyically plesent in lya at the tiTea h!ins eatl.
67. See supra note 4.
68. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
69. 735 F.2d at 650. International law provides protection for those harmed by expro-
priations of foreign-owned firms in developing countries. Contemporary international law
recognizes the right of a sovereign to expropriate alien properties, but subjects such right
to rules of non-discrimination, territorial limitation and the principles of public utility
and adequate compensation. See Burton & Inoue, Expropriations of Foreign-Owned
Firms in Developing Countries, A Cross-National Analysis, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 396
(1984). That study notes:
A large number of. . .expropriations in recent years have been stimulated
by formal recognition of [the sovereign's rights to expropriate alien properties]
as exemplified by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the Resolution
on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (Resolution 1803 (XVII)) in
1962, and the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Eco-
nomic Order (Resolution 3201 (S-VI)) and the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States (Resolution 3281 (XXIX)) in 1974.
Id. at 396. In a case like Garcia, the "adequate compensation" would probably be a small
percentage of the funds expropriated, but discussions between the United States and
Cuba on settlement and compensation terms ceased in 1961, when diplomatic relations
between the two nations were severed. Burton & Inoue, supra at 413. International law
has therefore proven to be totally inadequate in protecting plaintiffs, as here, against
expropriation of their property.
70. Vishipco Line, 660 F.2d 854; Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905), overruled
in part, Shaffer v. Heitner, 430 U.S. 189 (1977) (Harris had held that jurisdiction could
always be obtained through attachment of a defendant's intangible property in the fo-
rum state, but Shaffer requires "minimum contacts" as a basis for jurisdiction).
71. 735 F.2d at 651.
72. 61 N.Y.2d 460, 463 N.E.2d 5, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1984).
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to Garcia on the facts," the Court of Appeals of New York applied an
act of state doctrine analysis to the confiscation of the bank's debt for
CDs purchased at its Cuban branch.74 The majority held that, since the
situs of the debt was in Cuba, the act of state doctrine precluded an
inquiry into the propriety of the confiscation, and the bank's surrender
of funds representing the debt for the CDs to Cuba relieved it of fur-
ther responsibility to pay the depository.7
Perez and Judge Kearse's dissent in Garcia are very persuasive in
their act of state doctrine analyses. In Garcia, however, Judge Meskill
maintained that the facts called for a decision favoring Garcia.7 6 In so
holding, the court found the act of state doctrine inapplicable and im-
plied a contractual obligation analysis. Indeed, one may interpret
Judge Meskill's statement that, "even if what occurred was a seizure of
the debt and not merely payment of a sum equal to it, the facts in the
instant case call for a result favoring Garcia,' 77 as a pronouncement of
a contractual obligation exception to the act of state doctrine.
3. The "Private Contract" between Chase and Garcia
The contractual obligation exception to the act of state doctrine
set forth in Garcia seems to have its roots in the general rule of home
office liability for branch obligations. Under this rule, when the branch
fails to meet its obligations, the home office is liable.7 8 In Sokoloff v.
National City Bank,7 9 the bank argued that Russia's seizure of branch
assets was a cancellation of the bank's liability to branch depositors.
The Court of Appeals of New York stated that, although Russia could
prevent the branch from doing business in that country, the end of a
branch was not the end of the bank's "duty to make restitution for
benefits received without requital." 80 In holding the home office liable
for the branch's contractual obligation, the court noted: "this contract
the defendant has not yet performed, yet it refuses to return the dol-
lars that were paid to it by the plaintiff upon its promise of perform-
ance."' Similarly, in Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank,8 2 the
73. Id. at 462. In Perez, the plaintiff had purchased five certificates of deposit, which
were confiscated by the Cuban Government in 1959. Id.
74. Id. at 466.
75. Id.
76. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 650.
77. Id.
78. United States v. First National City Bank, 321 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1963).
79. 239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924).
80. Id. at 167.
81. Id. at 166.
82. 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
[Vol. 7
CONTRACT OBLIGATION
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held a bank's home office liable for
Saigon deposits where the branch had ceased operations in Vietnam
prior to a confiscation order."3 In addition, the court noted that the
home office was liable for the Saigon deposits because it operated its
business in Vietnam through a branch rather than through a separate
corporate entity.84
Although Vishipco adheres to the general rule of home office lia-
bility, the dicta as to a "separate corporate entity"'s indicates the
court's recognition of a possible exception to the general rule. One
commentator, Heininger, has suggested the application of a "separate
doctrine" for bank branches.8 8 According to Heininger:
Both Sokoloff and general corporate principles support the
general rule that the home office of a bank may be held liable
for deposits that its foreign branches wrongfully refuse to pay.
This liability, however, is not without limit. In the field of
banking, the general rule is subject to the important qualifica-
tions that the bank's liability will generally be measured pri-
marily by the law of the jurisdiction where the foreign branch
is located. Choice of law principles of general application might
bring about the same result, but the inclination of courts to
reach this conclusion is reinforced by concepts unique to bank-
ing which have come to be known as the separate entity doc-
83. Id. at 862-63: "Since ... Chase's branch in Saigon was neither open nor operat-
ing at the time of the confiscation and in fact had been abandoned prior to that time, the
Vietnamese decree was ineffective as against Chase's debt to the plaintiffs." Id. at 863.
Heininger notes:
[T]he situs of a bank's debt on a deposit is considered to be at the branch where
the deposit is carried, but if the branch is closed, . . . the depositor has a claim
against the home office; thus, the situs of the debt represented by the deposit
would spring back and cling to the home office. If the situs of the debt ceased to
be within the territorial jurisdiction of (the confiscating statel from the time the
branch was closed, then at the time the confiscatory decree was promulgated,
[the confiscating state would) no longer [have] sufficient jurisdiction over it to
affect it.
Id. at 862 (quoting Heininger, supra note 65, at 975).
84. Id. at 863:
By operating in Saigon through a branch rather than through a separate
corporate entity, Chase accepted the risk that it would be liable elsewhere for
obligations incurred by its branch . . . . U.S. banks, by operating abroad
through branches rather than through subsidiaries, reassure foreign depositors
that their deposits will be safer with them than they would be in a locally incor-
porated bank.
Id.
85. Id.
86. Heininger, supra note 65, at 93Q-44.
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trine. According to this doctrine, a branch is treated for some
purposes as a distinct business entity rather than simply an
extention of the bank's home office. Hence the rules for deter-
mining the potential liability of a bank's home office in connec-
tion with foreign branch deposits differ from those that would
apply to non-banking corporations.
8
7
Heininger has suggested that expropriated branches should be treated
as liquidations of separate entities.88 Accordingly, remaining branch as-
sets would be marshalled and valued, and the proceeds would be dis-
tributed among the branch's creditors pro rata in relation to their
claims. Heininger notes, however, the difficulty in accomplishing such a
task.' Additionally, it should be noted that this method of satisfying
depositors of an expropriated branch may be academic in that the re-
maining branch assets may be minimal, if any.
In Garcia, the court did not even consider the application of a sep-
arate entity doctrine.' 0 Judge Meskill noted: "Chase 'accepted the risk
that it would be liable elsewhere for obligations incurred by its
branch.' "91 Because the branch represented that the New York office
would guarantee the CDs, 2 it seems reasonable for the court to have
refused to apply the separate entity doctrine. Indeed, the facts here
negated the basic premise of separation between the branch and the
home office. Consequently, Judge Meskill applied the general rule of
home office liability. Because the home office had accepted the risk
under the private contract for the CDs, the court held Chase liable "no
87. Id. at 930 (the separate entity doctrine is a development of state law and federal
courts have deferred to state law when federal authoriy is not implicated). Compare Det
Bergenske Dampskibsselskab v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 341 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1965) and
Shinto Shipping Co. v. Fibrex & Shipping Co., 425 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Cal. 1976), afi'd,
572 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1978) (private garnishment actions) with First Nat'l City Bank v.
I.R.S., 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960) and United States v.
First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965) (I.R.S. authority to issue subpoenas and ob-
tain Federal court injunctions). See also Note, Branch Bank as Separate Entity for At-
tachment Purposes: McCloskey v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 333 (1963).
88. Heininger, supra note 65, at 1027.
89. Id. at 1028.
90. 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984). The application of the separate entity doctrine to
bank branches has not been successful in the federal courts. See Vishipco Line v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Banco Na-
cional de Cuba, 658 F.2d 895, 901 (1981) (obligations between branches were not obliga-
tions between separate entities but merely matters of internal bookkeeping); Banco de
Vizcaya v. First Nat'l Bank, 514 F.Supp. 1280, 1283-85 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (opinion vacated
July 23, 1981); Digitrex, Inc. v. Johnson, 491 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
91. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 650.
92. Id. at 646.
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matter what happened in Cuba." 3
The contractual obligation analysis utilized in Garcia has not been
applied in all jurisdictions. In Perez, 4 the New York Court of Appeals
did not apply the home office liability doctrine enunciated in Sokoloff
and Vishipco. The court noted that, in those cases, the banks were not
entitled to rely upon a foreign sovereign's order confiscating a deposi-
tor's property because the bank's branches in the foreign state had
ceased operations prior to the confiscation order.9" Because the situs of
the deposit was no longer in the foreign state, the foreign sovereign's
confiscation order did not affect the bank's liability on the deposit.'
The Perez court distinguished its case by noting that the plaintiff had
the opportunity, prior to the seizure, to redeem the certificates in any
Chase branch, including the Cuban branch.97 The court concluded
that, because Chase's debt to the plaintiff was extinguished by the
seizure of plaintiff's account before the branch was nationalized, "there
is no occasion to apply the rationale of Sokoloff and Vishipco.""
The Second Circuit itself has not always applied a contractual ob-
ligation analysis. In First Nat'l Bank of Boston (Int'l) v. Banco Na-
cional de Cuba,99 the Second Circuit held that the act of state doctrine
barred a suit against a state-owned Cuban bank to recover un-
reimbursed payments by the plaintiff's assignor on letters of credit is-
sued by its Cuban branches prior to expropriation by the Cuban Gov-
ernment. In that decision, the court quoted Menendex v. Saks &
Co.,"'0 another Second Circuit decision, in which the court stated that
it would not recognize a quasi-contractual claim based on unjust en-
richment as an exception to the act of state doctrine."0' Mendenex had
held that the refusal by Cuban agents to reimburse importers for
amounts paid to Cuba by mistake for pre-intervention shipments was
an act of state. 02
The focus in these cases seems to be on the act of state doctrine
rather than on contractual interpretation, and, therefore, the contracts
are not determinative. Upon a finding that the expropriated debt's si-
tus was within the foreign sovereign's territory, the courts have applied
93. Id. at 650.
94. 61 N.Y.2d 460, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1984).
95. Id. at 473.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 474.
98. Id.
99. 658 F.2d 895, 901 (2d Cir. 1981).
100. 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Alfred Dunhill of
London Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
101. Id. at 1370.
102. Id.
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the act of state doctrine to relieve the debtor of his obligation to the
creditor. The policy behind these decisions is a recognition of a sover-
eign's power to govern itself and the determination that United States
courts should not pass judgment upon the actions of foreign sovereigns
in their own territories. 0 3 Accordingly, the courts have recognized the
foreign sovereign's power to extinguish a debt within the foreign state.
As in Garcia, however, a number of courts have bound parties to
their contracts even in expropriation cases. Although Perez seems to
suggest that New York does not recognize a contractual obligation ex-
ception to the act of state doctrine, there is case law that indicates
otherwise. In Gonzalez v. Indus. Bank of Cuba, the New York Court of
Appeals held that, where the plaintiff had purchased a United States
currency draft from a Cuban bank payable to her order on a bank lo-
cated in New York, Cuba's actions could not diminish the plaintiff's
right on the draft. 04 Thus, the plaintiff was able to collect on the draft
in New York notwithstanding the expropriation of the bank by the Cu-
ban Government. 0 5
Other jurisdictions have also refused to apply the act of state doc-
trine to relieve parties of contractual obligations. In Tabacalera Sever-
iano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that a suit by a Cuban corporation against a Florida
corporation to recover sums owed from the sale of tobacco concluded
prior to the Cuban revolution was not barred by the act of state doc-
trine.'0 6 The court concluded that the Cuban Government's actions
had not interfered with the plaintiff's right to collect its accounts and
that "this would be true even if the credit here be deemed to have a
'situs' in Cuba, or even if it be deemed to be in all material aspects the
same as tangible property."'0 7
Similarly, in Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco, the Fifth Cir-
cuit did not apply the act of state doctrine to relieve an insurance com-
pany of its obligation under a life insurance policy.0 8 Despite the fact
that the Cuban assets of the company were expropriated and national-
ized, the court held that the policy holder was entitled to receive the
dollar equivalent to pesos at the prevailing rate of exchange when the
life policy issued by a Texas insurance company was made payable in
pesos at Galveston, Texas. Likewise, in Pan-American Life Ins. Co.
103. See supra note 4.
104. 12 N.Y.2d 33, 234 N.Y.S. 2d 210 (1962).
105. Id.
106. 392 F.2d 706 (5th Ciro), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
107. Id. at 714.
108. 362 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1966).
109. Id. at 171.
[Vol. 7
CONTRACT OBLIGATION
v. Recio, a Florida court held that a fair reading of the policy made it
apparent that an important provision was that the policyholder might
travel to the United States and that the policy could be paid there.110
Therefore, even though the Cuban Government had seized the com-
pany's assets in Cuba, the insurance company was not excused from
performance under the contract."'
Garcia is based on this second line of cases and the general rule of
home office liability. The facts in Garcia, however, take the case a step
beyond the cases noted above. None of these decisions dealt with a
contract similar to the one in Garcia. The parties to those contracts for
accounts receivable, letters of credit and certificates of deposit did not
specifically agree on an allocation of the loss in case of an expropria-
tion of the debt, but the parties in Garcia did so agree, according to
the majority opinion. This aspect makes Garcia different from prior
case law, because Garcia recognizes the parties' ability to form such a
contract and gives it effect.1 1 2 Thus, the decision stands for the princi-
ple that where parties contemplate possible future actions by a sover-
eign, they may contract to protect against any such actions' interfer-
ence with their contractual relations.
Garcia has wide ranging implications in terms of the status of the
act of state doctrine in international law. If the contractual obligation
exception to the act of state doctrine is taken to its logical conclusion,
careful draftsmanship could render international commerce less vul-
nerable to acts of state. Risks could be allocated contractually rather
than by the act of a foreign sovereign. International commerce would
be governed by freedom of contract principles. The parties would be
free to negotiate returns in relation to the risk undertaken and each
party would be assured the benefit of its bargain. For example, a bank
that had agreed to absorb the risk of a nationalized branch could offer
less interest on deposits with such a branch, and, conversely, a deposi-
tor who had agreed to absorb the risk of nationalized branch and
seizure of the depositor's account could bargain for higher interest.
The Garcia majority's contention that its decision is consistent
with the policy considerations behind the act of state doctrine1 is a
valid one. The decision does not judge Cuba's sovereign actions, nor
does it interfere with the foreign affairs powers of the executive.1 4 It
does not affect the relations between the United States and Cuba;
rather, it affects the relations between a bank's foreign branch, the
110. 154 So.2d 197, 199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 990 (1964).
111. Id.
112. 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984).
113. Id. at 651.
114. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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home office and the branch depositors. Had the litigation in this case
involved a party to the contract suing Cuba, the act of state doctrine
and hence, sovereign immunity would have been implicated.1 5 When
the issue is solely a matter of contractual interpretation as to the
agreed upon allocation of risk of possible loss from expropriation, how-
ever, the act of state concerns are minimal, because Cuba will not be
affected by the allocation of the loss. Garcia does not hold that Cuba's
expropriation was invalid or that there was no expropriation or that
Cuba must give back the funds. Indeed, the decision is so vague that
one is not clear how the court categorizes Cuba's action. The court held
that "even if what occurred was a seizure of the debt and not merely
payment of a sum equal to it, the facts in the instant case call for a
result favoring Garcia.""' The court avoided an analysis of Cuba's ac-
tion and concentrated on the contractual relationship between Chase
and Garcia. It seems proper that the cause of action in Garcia was not
barred by the act of state doctrine. In a case in which the validity or
categorization of a foreign sovereign's actions is not at issue, parties
should be allowed to bring their cases before a United States court to
adjudicate their legal rights.
Garcia also limits the ability of defendants to hide behind the act
of state doctrine. Consequently, because Chase's Cuban branch repre-
sented that "Chase's main office would guarantee the certificate(s) and
that (depositors) could be repaid by presenting the certificate(s) at any
Chase branch world-wide,"" 7 Chase's New York office had to live up to
those representations.1 ' To rule otherwise would permit a fraud to be
perpetrated on the branch depositors through an application of the act
of state doctrine.
Judge Kearse's dissent, however, attacked the basic premise of the
majority's "contractual exception to the act of state doctrine." 9 The
dissent's argument, that the jury concluded that the parties did not
contract to ensure payment on the CDs even if the debt was seized by
Cuba,1 2 0 seems persuasive. The jury's responses to interrogatories
115. 735 F.2d 645. As the court in Garcia stated:
We are not challenging the validity of the Cuban government's actions here and
Cuba has shown no interest in the outcome of this case. We are simply resolving
a private dispute between an American bank and one of its depositors. The re-
sult we reach will have no international repercussions. Chase cannot use the act
of state doctrine as a defense because the doctrine is not implicated.
Id. at 651.
116. Id. at 650.
117. Id. at 646.
118. Id. at 650.
119. Id. at 652 n.*; see supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
120. 735 F.2d at 650 n.6; see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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four"2 ' and five' 22 seem to indicate that the jury concluded that the
parties did not contract for payment on the CDs, regardless of what
happened in Cuba. Still, the majority's interpretation of the jury's
findings, in view of the jury's determination that Chase was liable to
Garcia, 23 was valid. Because the jury concluded that Chase was liable
to Garcia, it seems logical to infer that they also concluded that the
Cuban Government's seizure of a sum equal to the CD did not effect
the bank's contractual obligation to pay Garcia. In view of the fact that
the court's decision is based on the determination that the parties con-
tracted to ensure payment on the CDs even if the debt was seized by
Cuba, 12 it may have been more appropriate for the court to have or-
dered reconsideration of the jury interrogatories, as the dissent
suggested.
125
The importance of Garcia lies not in its interpretation of the jury's
findings but in its establishment of a contractual obligation exception
to the act of state doctrine. The dissent's criticism is not directed at
the validity of the exception, but at its application in this case. Indeed,
the dissent acknowledged that "the parties could, of course, have
agreed that even if the Cuban government required Chase to pay it a
sum equal to Garcia's account, Chase would still have a contractual
obligation to pay Garcia. '"12 Clearly, it seems that the entire Garcia
court at least implicitly recognized a contractual obligation exception
to the act of state doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Garcia illustrates that courts are willing to look beyond the mere
mechanical application of established doctrines in adjudicating the lia-
bility of a bank for deposits in expropriated branches. The decision
may be viewed as the creation of a contractual obligation exception to
the act of state doctrine, but it should also be viewed as indicative of
the balancing involved in choosing whether to apply the act of state
doctrine or the general rule of home office liability in confiscation
cases. It seems appropriate that, when the circumstances do not de-
mand the application of the act state doctrine, the court should con-
sider as determinative the bank's contractual obligations and the possi-
bility of a fraud being perpetrated on the branch depositors. It should
121. 735 F.2d at 650 n.6; see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
122. 735 F.2d at 650 n.6; see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
123. 735 F.2d at 650 n.6; see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
124. 735 F.2d at 650.
125. Id. at 652 n.l.
126. Id. at 652 (emphasis in original).
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be noted, however, that Garcia involved an unusual contract. In future
cases when a branch does not make specific representations that the
home office guarantees the deposits, a court may find the Garcia con-
tractual obligation analysis inapplicable.
Most significant is the court's decision to apply a contractual obli-
gation, rather than act of state analysis. This approach affords parties
the opportunity to a contract a greater degree of certainty in their con-
tractual relations. Rather than being subjected to the whims of a for-
eign sovereign, parties may contract to allocate the loss from possible
expropriations. With this greater degree of certainty in international
contracts, international commerce will be less risky for all, whether a
modest depositor or a world-wide bank.
Steven Verveniotis
